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LABOR LAW AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION1955 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL H. SANDERS* AND JAMES GILMER BOWMAN, JR.t

STRIKE

In Stokeley Van Camp, Inc. v. United Packinghouse Workers of
America, the company and the union had entered into a collective
bargaining agreement under which there were to be no strikes or lockouts pending the use of the grievance and arbitration procedures provided in the contract. The chancellor enjoined members of the union
from participating in a strike, and in such incidental activities as mass
picketing, and threatening and intimidating persons seeking to enter
and leave the plant. The company's bill and affidavits indicated the
existence of a strike with mass picketing and threats of violence. The
union did not file counter affidavits. Its answer denied the statements
of the company in the bill and asserted that the acts complained
of were brought on by company officials and not by the union. The
chancellor ordered the injunction made permanent after the defendant union fled a motion to dissolve it.
In an opinion by Justice Prewitt, the Tennessee Supreme Court
affirmed the decree of the chancellor. The union and its members were
considered to be "in no position" to be granted a dissolution of the
injunction "on account of the fact they have not complied with their
contract," the court citing an American Law Reports annotation. 2
There is no further elaboration of the appropriateness of the injunctive
remedy under the circumstances and no information as to the basis
upon which the appellant union sought to have the decree below
reversed.
Insofar as this decision affirms the use of an injunction against mass
picketing and threats of violence, it may be regarded as routine once
it is assumed that a sufficient showing was made of the need for
equitable relief to prevent the recurrence of such conduct. 3 However,
the decree enjoins the members of the union from "participating in
the strike." The scope of this language, if it is to be taken literally,
coupled with the contractual basis upon which it rests, could make the
decision one of major significance, particularly when viewed against
recent decisions having to do with federal pre-emption of the regulation of labor relations. 4 A prohibition of the right to strike under the
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University.
t LL.B. Vanderbilt University; LL.M. Harvard University.
1. 274 S.W.2d 2 (Tenn. 1954).
2. 2 A.L.R.2d 1278, 1280 (1948).

3. See Sanders and Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAm. L. REV. 861, 862 (1954).
4. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), collects and discusses
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circumstances is involved. The state court here granted preventive
relief in an order which is an undoubted regulation of labor relations
as such. The decree is much broader than that needed to preserve
order and to protect persons and property from violence-traditional
state police powers which, as all the recent federal pre-emption cases
have recognized, remain undisturbed by this developing line of
authority. The name of the plaintiff in the case suggests a sufficient
relationship to interstate commerce to bring it within the general
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.5 If, under these
circumstances, the conduct attributable to the union was an unfair
labor practice as set out in Section 8 (b) of the National Labor Relations Act,6 then, under the rule of the much-discussed decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States, Garner v. Teamsters, Chauffeurs
& Helpers Local Union No. 776 (AFL),7 the state court would be without jurisdiction. Further, if the union conduct, instead of being prohibited as in the Garnercase, was protected activity under some provision of the Taft-Hartley Act, the state court would lack jurisdiction
under the rule of the more recent Anheuser-Busch case.8 A strike in
violation of a contract not to strike fits neither of these categories in
any precise sense-at least it is not prohibited under the federal law
as an unfair labor practice by a labor organization. 9 The federal policy
against such strikes, however, is illustrated by those decisions of
the National Labor Relations Board which have refused to require
reinstatement of employees discharged for engaging in such strikes. 10
Another aspect of the pre-emption question, in a situation such as
that in the Stokeley Van Camp case, is presented by Section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley) 11 which permits suits
to be brought in the federal courts for violation of contracts between
an employer and a labor organization representing employees of an
industry affecting commerce, without respect to the amount in controversy or the citizenship of the parties. Injunctive relief in the
federal courts against a union striking in violation of a no-strike agreement remains unavailable to an employer despite Section 301 because
of the restrictions of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act.12 The
differences of opinion between the justices of the United States
Supreme Court making up the majority in the recent Association of
the other important decisions on this point.
5. 49 STAT. 450, 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 152(6)-(7), 160(a) (1947).
6. 61 STAT. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(b) (Supp. 1954).
7. 346 U.S. 485 (1953).

8. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
9. But cf. Rice, A Paradox of Our National Labor Law, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 233,
234 (1951).
10. Granite City Steel Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 894 (1949); cf. Dorsey Trailers,
80 N.L.R.B. 478 (1948).
11. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (Supp. 1954).
12. Bakery Sales Drivers Local Union No. 33 v. Wagshal, 333 U.S. 437 (1948);
see Rice, supra note 9.
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13
Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
suggest that further decisions must come before light is thrown on
the character of the substantive rights being enforced under Section
301. Though not addressing themselves to the pre-emption problem,
the Westinghouse opinions do not indicate that state courts are ousted
of jurisdiction over suits to enforce collective bargaining contracts.
The possible variations in contract interpretation, as well as in
remedies, between states and between state and federal courts suggest grave practical problems for the future, and the pre-emption
question will probably be an aspect of the litigation which will develop.
There is nothing in the Stokeley Van Camp case, however, to suggest
that the question of federal pre-emption was injected at any level of
discussion. Remaining for consideration are the legal principles upon
which the union's conduct was found unlawful and an injunction, appropriate. The case is in line with the normal common-law rule with
regard to the legality of a strike under similar circumstances. 14 The
separate question, as to the appropriateness of granting equitable relief against striking, is thought by many authorities to require a
more detailed analysis of many pertinent factors than are referred to
in the court's opinion in this case. 15 The ineptness of injunctive decree
as a means of remedying unfortunate labor relations problems is no
less today than it was when so many legislative bodies sought to limit
the use of this device in labor cases.1 6 Issuance of orders without adequate hearing and consideration of all factors involved characterized
a situation widely regarded as abusive.'7 For these reasons, as well
as others, it would appear that, to the extent that our state courts
have an area for valid action which will not run afoul of exclusive
federal regulation of this subject matter, they should weigh carefully
all the factors that inform the judgment as to the proper use, if any,
of the sweeping remedy of injunction as a means of regulating labor
relations problems.

SUITS BY LABOR ORGANIZATIONS
Apart from the Stokeley Van Camp case, there were no other decisions during the survey period which involve "labor law" in the
sense of being concerned with joint relations between employers and
labor organizations. 8 In Smith v. Archer,19 the Supreme Court of
13. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
14. See 2 A.L.R.2d 1278, 1280 (1948); cf. RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 795 1939).
15. RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 933-43 (1939).

16. See Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 38 STAT. 738 (1914), 29 U.S.C.A. § 52
(1947), and the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-15
(1947), which became the prototypes of many state laws of similar import.
17. See generally, FRANKFURTER & GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
18. But see Hobbs v. Lewis, 270 S.W.2d 352 (Tenn. 1954); Hartley v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 276 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1954).
19. 270 S.W.2d 375 (Tenn. 1954).
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Tennessee affirmed a dismissal for misjoinder of parties plaintiff where
officers of a local union had filed a declaration for libel, individually,
as such officers and on behalf of the members of the local. The court
treated the case, in an opinion by Justice Tomlinson, as presenting a
question of permissible joinder of the individual claim of each officer
and the union's claim "as an association," or as the court said, "whether
the three may sue jointly for the alleged libel of each." Proceeding
on the assumption that such joinder is not permissible unless the
cause of action is joint and the well-established principle that in
defamation the wrong, if any, is several, the court concludes that
"principle, logic, applicable rules of law, textwriters and persuasive
precedent require us to decide that the joinder of these three plaintiffs,
in this action for libel, for their separate injuries is not permissible." 20
The case treats the union as an entity or rather as a "person" for purposes of a libel action. Does this mean that the union could sue in its
own behalf for an alleged libel? The decision appears to be entirely in
keeping with traditional thought as to the nature of a libel action and
permissive joinder of causes of action. 21 From the labor relations
standpoint, however, some concern should be expressed as to the state
of the law if it effectively blocks court action to enforce the rights of
labor organizations and their members in the only way that would
likely prove feasible for the enforcement of such rights. The courts
cannot be expected to solve the basic problems of labor relations, but
can be expected to fashion our legal institutions so as to encourage a
belief that the law is not only supreme, and to be obeyed, but that it
is equally available and impartial in its approach to all problems regardless of which group, or class or interest invokes its processes.
From this standpoint it would be rather important to determine
whether this decision carries the implication that the union could sue
for libel as a person in its own behalf.
UNEMPLOYMENT

COMPENSATION

In Moore v. Commissioner of Employment Security,22 the Tennessee
Supreme Court reversed the chancery court and dismissed the suit of
a claimant for unemployment compensation. The claimant had quit
night work because he considered it injurious to his health and, in
registering at the employment office, had indicated his willingness to
work only a day shift. His claim for unemployment compensation
was denied ultimately by the Board of Review in the Department of
Employment Security because of the statutory requirement that a
20. 270 S.W.2d at 377.
21. See infra, Morgan, Procedure and Evidence-1955 Tennessee Survey,
for reference to the same case. That "traditional thought" on this aspect
of joinder is not the best thought is reflected by the flexible provisions
set out in FED. R.Civ. P. 18, 20, 23.
22. 273 S.W.2d 703 (Tenn. 1954).
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"claimant" be "able ... and.., available for work."2 3 In reversing the
chancellor and upholding the decision of the Board of Review, the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Burnett, quoted extensively
from a recent Minnesota decision,2 which rejected a limitation on
availability for personal reasons as opposed to reasons connected with
the work. Apparently the Tennessee decision likewise rejected the
idea that a claimant could be eligible for unemployment insurance
even though he had good personal reasons for limiting his availability
to certain hours. However, in the Moore case the claimant presented
no medical evidence that his shift work was the cause of his alleged
nervousness and inability to eat. Limitations on working hours for
good personal reasons are not treated as making a claimant "unavailable" for work under the practices prevailing in a majority of the
states,2 although most of the reports of litigated cases are probably to
the contrary. Since the record in this case fell far short of establishing
any good personal reasons requiring the claimant to avoid shift work,
the opinion cannot necessarily be treated as rendering such reasons
immaterial in determining "availability."26
WORKMEN'S

COMPENSATION

The volume of litigation in this area continues to be heavy, twentyfour decisions of the Supreme Court of Tennessee being published
during the survey year. Legislative and private studies of the overall
effectiveness of the system have been more intensive during this same
period, and it is possible that these studies will result in major changes
27
in the procedural aspects of the statutory framework.
The Employment Relationship: Two of the reported decisions during
the survey year raise a question as to the existence of the employment
relationship, a basic requirement of liability. 8 In Rote v. Walls29
the petitioner at the time of the accident was working as a carpenter
on a house being built by defendant partners, engaged in the business
of building houses. The defendants appealed from an award of
compensation by the trial judge contending that the petitioner was the
23. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6901.28 C (Williams Supp. 1952).

24. Swanson v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 240 Minn. 449, 61

N.W.2d 526 (1953).

25. See ALTMAN, AvAILABILITY FOR WoRK 283 (1950); U. S. BUREAU OF EM-

PLOYMENT SEcURITY, DEP'T OF LABOR, COMPARISON OF STATE UNEMPLOYMENT

INSURANCE LAWS 40-65 (1949).
26. For extensive discussion of the more important legal aspects of unemployment insurance, see the several articles appearing in the symposium on
that subject. A Symposium on Unemployment Insurance, 8 VAND. L. REV. 179-

494 (1955).

27. See HOLLY AND MABRY, PROTECTIVE LABOR LEGISLATION AND ITS ADMINIsTRATION IN TENNESSEE (1955); Note, Some Problems Arising Under the Workmen's CompensationLaw of Tennessee, 8 VANn. L. REV. 616 (1955).
28. See Sanders and Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-

1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV. 861, 864-66 (1954).
29. 274 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1954).
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employee of an independent contractor. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Prewitt, affirmed, stating that the preponderance of
the proof showed that the petitioner was an employee and that the
alleged independent contractor was himself a mere employee of the
defendants. The opinion gives no inkling of what the proof consisted to support either of the contentions. It can be assumed that the
court is following the usual "right to control" test 30 but in the absence
of any reference to significant facts underlying the court's conclusion
no guidance is received from the decision.
Kempkau v. Cathey3' involves the question of the "borrowed employee." Cathey was regularly employed as a truck driver in the delivery of building materials by Kempkau, but did not work on Saturday afternoons. One Saturday afternoon the general foreman of
Kempkau borrowed one of the employer's trucks and arranged with
Cathey to drive it in moving some furniture of the general foreman's
domestic servant. After moving the furniture and taking another
helper home, Cathey was killed in an accident while returning the
truck to Kempkau's usual place of business. The general foreman was
not paid for the Saturday afternoon but Cathey's hours were paid for
by Kempkau. The general foreman also paid a sum to Cathey for the
afternoon's work. An award of compensation to Cathey's widow and
minor dependent children in a suit against Kempkau was reversed by
the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice Swepston. Cathey was
"loaned" to the foreman and Kempkau's payment of wages to him
for the period is not controlling. The fact that Cathey had completed
his activities for the foreman and was returning Kempkau's truck to
its usual place of storage is not significant, the opinion states. The
relationship of master and servant is suspended until the servant or
property loaned is returned to the point where the same is available
to the use of the master.
A leading authority in this field says that a special employer will
not be liable for accidental injury or death to the "borrowed" employee unless all of these three tests are met:
"(a) the employee has made a contract of hire, express or implied,
with the special employer;
(b) the work being done is essentially that of the special employer;
and
(c) the special employer has the right to control the details of
the work."' 2
If the relationship with the special employer satisfies the above
conditions, then the general employer will be relieved of liability
30. See Sanders and Bowman, supra note 28, at 864-66.
31. 277 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. 1955).
32. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 48.00 (1952).
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under the workmen's compensation statutes unless it can be said that
at the same time the conditions are also satisfied with the general or
another (a dual) employer. 33 Judgment might well differ as to the
application of these principles in the instant case. The Supreme Court's
decision seems to indulge little or no presumption in favor of the retention of employment status with the general employer. The inference of the trial judge is set aside and the relationship established
as a matter of law. The approach is essentially the same as that used
in determining "deviations" from the employer's business. To treat
the existence of the relationship under all the circumstances as leaving no room for the drawing of an inference by the trial judge as to
the status of the truck driver driving his regular employer's truck
back to its regular location while receiving his regular pay from
that employer seems unduly restrictive.
Injury by Accident Arising Out of Employment: The statutory requirement in workmen's compensation that the covered employee
suffer injury by accident "arising out of" employment expresses the
causal connection that must exist between the employment and the
injury. There must be a rational connection between the work and
the injury by something more than mere coincidence. This general
problem, more than any other, has arisen in the reported cases during
the survey period.
In Jones v. Corder3 4 the employer owned and operated a taxi service. He defended a compensation suit, by deceased taxi driver's divorced wife for the benefit of the employee's son, on the ground that
the fatal accident did not arise out of and in the course of employment.
There was some evidence that the employer required that he be
notified before a taxi driver undertook to drive a passenger to Nashville and that an extra driver be carried on such a trip. Without giving
any such notification, the employee agreed to carry a passenger from
his residence to Nashville. The driver then asked his girl friend to
accompany him on the trip but he never received her answer. Apparently, he intended to pick up his passenger and then drive to the
girl's home which was on the same highway, but beyond the residence
of the passenger. On a direct route to the passenger's abode, but before
reaching it, the driver was killed. The Supreme Court affirmed a
compensation award. The court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Neil,
treated the questions presented as issues of fact and held that the
employee was within the scope of his employment in agreeing to
make the trip, was where his duty required him to be at the time of
the accident, and was acting for the benefit of his employer. The proposed trip for the girl was said to be incidental and inconsequential
to the employee's main purpose of transporting a passenger for hire.
33. Ibid.

34. 196 Tenn. 478, 268 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. 1954).
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This case does not appear to present any unusual feature. The employee was where his employment required him to be. As a taxi driver,
the hazard of injury from automobile accidents might be considered
significantly greater than that encountered by the general public. The
court was not impressed with the argument that the employee had
perhaps undertaken the trip in violation of the rules of the employer,
though the rule that the employer be notified of plans to drive to Nashville would not necessarily be designed as a safety rule for the employee. A different case might have been present had the accident
occurred between the passenger's house and the girl's. The court must
have felt that the cab driver was to pick up the passenger before
going to his girl's house or else discussion of the case of Free v.
Indemnity Insurance Co.35 might have been injected. There, a straight
line route of travel was divided into segments because of personal
errands to be accomplished along the route. If this employee had
been going to the girl's first, compensation might have been denied
by analogy to the Free case.
In Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc. 36 employees had been hired in
Memphis, Tennessee, to do masonry work at an Arkansas plantation.
The employer arranged for meals and lodging for the employees in a
nearby Arkansas town. Transportation from Memphis and to and
from the plantation to the Arkansas town was furnished by the
employer. Because of rain the employee in question had been instructed to quit work earlier than usual and was being driven in the
employer's truck to the town when a tornado struck the truck on the
highway, and he died from the resulting injuries. A compensation
award was reversed by the Tennessee Supreme Court, in an opinion
by Justice Tomlinson, on the grounds that the death arose out of an
act of God and could not be attributed by law to the employment.
Justices Burnett and Prewitt joined in a strong dissent to the court's
reasoning that this tornado was a hazard common to the community
and to highway travellers and was not a foreseeable hazard incident
to the employment. The dissenting justices urged this definition of
the phrase "arising out of": "An injury arises out of the employment
if it arises out of the nature, conditions, obligations or incidents of
the employment; in other words, out of the employment looked at in
any of its aspects.1 37 Hence, they felt that there was a sufficient connection between the employment and the accident since the employment required the employee to be where he was at the time of injury.
Further, since he was required to travel, the risks of the road should
be regarded as incidental to the employment. Thus, they would in35. 177 Tenn. 287, 145 S.W.2d 1026 (1941).

See 1

LARSON, WORKMEN'S COM-

PENSATION § 19.23 (1952).

36. 270 S.W.2d 389 (Tenn. 1954).

37. Id. at 395, quoting from Caswell's Case, 305 Mass. 500, 26 N.E.2d 328,
330 (1940).
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clude this situation under the "street risk exception" to the general
rule of no liability for hazards common to the general community.
There would seem to be much merit to these arguments, which
embody what is known as the "positional risk" doctrine.3
The majority of the court apparently would require that there be
some peculiar or increased risk involved before compensation would be
due. To impose liability affirmative answers would be demanded to
these questions (the second considered to be embraced within the
first):
'Was the danger of being injured by a storm while traveling to and
from his work in a truck along a public highway a danger peculiar to
Jackson's work, rather than a danger common to the neighborhood
through which the storm happened to be raging at the time it struck
the truck which was traveling through that neighborhood?
"Could such an injury reasonably have been contemplated if it had
been thought of at the time of the employment as a risk incident to
Jackson's duties?" 39
The court concluded that "acts of God are held compensable when
the employee, by reason of his employment, is subjected to a hazard
from such act of God not common to the general public, but peculiar to
the nature of the employment and to the conditions under which that
employment is required to be performed." 40 There was no peculiar
hazard here, so no liability attached because of the accident. This is
the "peculiar or increased risk" doctrine and perhaps the majority
rule.
By definition or common understanding, an act of God is not
reasonably foreseeable. It is sudden, unexpected, rare and unusual.
Therefore, the widow here would seem to be precluded from relief before she started asking for it. How far does the approach of the
majority restrict the street risk exception? 41 Certainly it seems reasonable, as the dissenters point out, that but for the employment the
employee here would have been in Memphis at the time of the tornado
-or at least not on this road. Also, by instructions from his employer
he was there earlier than usual. If the court did not choose to rely
on these factors and to award compensation but rather went the whole
way and denied it on the act of God grounds (the accident was not
reasonably foreseeable), it appears unlikely that it will try to distinguish other circumstances in other cases of a similar nature. Compensation could have been awarded here on the limited grounds
indicated without opening the gates to a flood of liability awards in
storm cases. If the court requires reasonable foreseeability in these
cases, and an act of God is not foreseeable by definition, then no
38. 1 LARsoN, WoRKmN's COMPENSATION §§ 8.20, 10.00 (1952).
39. Jackson v. Clark & Fay, Inc., 270 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tenn. 1954).

40. Id. at 392.

41. See 1 LARSON, WomKMEN's COMPENSATION § 9.00 (1952).
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injury resulting from an act of God would be compensable. However,
the court indicates that acts of God are compensable if the employee
is "subjected to a hazard from such act of God not common to the
general public, but peculiar to the nature of the employment and to
the conditions under which that employment is required to be performed." 42
A demurrer to a widow's petition for compensation was sustained
in the case of Reed v. Langford,43 and this action was affirmed by the
Supreme Court. According to the allegations of the complaint, the
deceased husband was employed as a night clerk and janitor in a
hotel. He was found dead at a place inside the hotel where his work
required him to be. He was said to have died from a non-self-inflicted
gunshot wound. There were no witnesses to the shooting, the assassin
had never been discovered, and the reason for the shooting was unknown. It was further averred that the hotel was frequented by
persons of dubious character and was often visited by the police.
The employee was a retired carpenter who had been employed, before going to work at the hotel, as a guard at the state penitentiary,
where according to the petition, the owner of the hotel was confined at
the time of the accident. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Swepston, followed the precedent of Farrisv. Yellow Cab Co.,44 and
stated that "where an employee is found at his post of labor during the
time that he is usually employed and there is no direct evidence of
the manner of his death, an inference may arise of an accident arising
out of and in the course of his employment but that if the facts alleged
give rise to more than one reasonable inference as to the cause of
death the rule cannot apply." 45 The court held that it would be
reasonable to infer that the death either was connected with the
employment or with the deceased's previous occupation as a prison
guard. Hence, the petition did not state a cause of action.
A leading authority states: "When an employee is found dead under
circumstances indicating that death took place within the time and
space limits of the employment, in the absence of any evidence of
what caused the death most courts will indulge a presumption or inference that the death arose out of the employment." 46 In the case of
47
unexplained assaults, the cases are more evenly divided.
In the Reed case nothing was alleged which would definitely connect the death with the employment in the view of the court. Taking
the allegations as true, it would seem that the hotel was frequented by
police characters and others usually regarded as "beyond the pale."
42. Supra note 39, at 392.
43. 276 S.W.2d 735 (Tenn. 1955).
44. 189 Tenn. 46, 222 S.W.2d 187 (1949).

45. Supranote 43, at 737.
46. 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S
47. 1 id. § 11.33.

COMPENSATION § 10.32 (1952).
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Such persons might tend to be somewhat violent and violence might
well be directed against them by others. Therefore, it is probable that
death resulted from employment. Also from the fact that the employee
worked at night in a public place in a disreputable neighborhood, it
might be argued that his employment placed him in a more exposed
position than he would otherwise face. It has been considered that
the primary question is one of whether the employment situation
placed the employee where the danger of attack, work-connected or
otherwise, is increased. If so increased, it should be for the employer
to show either that the danger was not increased or that the attack
would have occurred wherever the employee might have been found.
Larson states that the question should be whether the employment
brought deceased in contact with the risk that caused the injury.48
This is not the reasoning adopted by the court in the instant case.
Heron v. Girdley also declares that "finding a person dead at his
post of duty itself does not alone raise a prima facie case. '49 In this
case an award of compensation to a widow for the unexplained death
of her husband was affirmed. The deceased was found dead in the
room where he dug coal in a mine, and there were no witnesses to
his death. It appeared from the evidence that he suffered from and
died as a result of myocarditis, high blood pressure, and hypertension,
in other words, a heart attack. There was circumstantial evidence
that he had engaged in physical labor prior to his death-he had
pushed an empty mine car over a ris% in the mine floor. It was also
shown that the air in the mine was "bad" in that it did not meet government specifications and did not circulate as rapidly as it should
have. The court reasoned in an opinion by Ridley, Special Judge,
that the circumstances of the death could be proved by circumstantial
evidence, and that it was sufficiently shown that the deceased had performed manual or strenuous labor immediately prior to death. There
was medical testimony that this exertion would contribute to death
from a heart attack and that was sufficient to bring about liability.
The court also indicated that the fact that there was medical testimony
that the "bad" air would contribute to or accelerate the death, and
that this or the exertion, would have been enough alone to invoke
liability. In combination, they made the most reasonable inference to
be drawn that of a death arising out of employment.
The result of this case is in accordance with the usual rule. As
stated by the court, "where the deceased is found dead at his post
of duty and manual labor or physical exertion is proven a prima facie
case may, under the circumstances of each case, be made out that
death was due to an accident arising out of and in the course of the
employment of the deceased." 50 The mere fact that he was found dead
48. Ibid.

49. 277 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tenn. 1955).
50. Id. at 408.

1048

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

in the mine apparently was not enough to make a prima facie case.
Considering the immediate cause of death (heart attack), the evidence
of physical exertion, and that "bad" or "tight" air would increase the
likelihood of death from such a cause, sufficed to prove a prima facie
case. The court held that the medical evidence was not speculative
and that the exertion or strain had been sufficiently proved by circumstantial evidence in that the mine car had been left at the
entrance to the room where deceased worked in the mine and was
found after his death to have been pushed along the tracks into the
room and over a rise or bump in the floor. Further the deceased was
lying on the tracks between the entrance and the car. A predisposing
weakness or condition in the employee would not prevent the subsequent accident from "arising out of" the work if some work exer51
tion actually precipitated it.
In Mid-South Publishing Co. v. Raybon 2 a widow sued to recover
compensation for the death of her husband. On April 29, 1951, the
deceased suffered severe burns (some third degree) from an accident
which was conceded to arise out of and in the course of his employment with the publishing company. He was hospitalized for about
two weeks and then confined to his home under the treatment of a
physician in the employ of the insurance carrier. He never returned
to work after the accident. In September, 1951, he developed a swelling in his foot and leg (thrombo-phlebitis) requiring a series of
operations. He died in Februasy, 1952, from heart failure brought on
immediately by the strain of pumping blood through the swollen leg.
The record contained a statement of the attending physician to the
effect that the leg condition would not have developed if the employee
had not been burned as he was. The Supreme Court, in an opinion by
Chief Justice Neil, affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the
widow, finding that the death was indirectly, if not directly, caused by
the severe burns whose relation to the employment was unquestioned.
In Parrott v. Parrott53 another chain-of-consequences case is presented, resulting in the affirmance of an award of compensation to a
widow. Deceased was a sawyer whose duties included lifting headings
and blocks weighing from 40 to 150 pounds. He became sick about an
hour after going to work on April 1, 1953, and his condition was diagnosed as brain hemorrhage. After hospitalization he was allowed to
return to his home with instructions to rest. He did no work until
approximately October 7, 1953, when he started driving a truck, a job
requiring no heavy lifting. He became unconscious while driving the
truck on November 7, 1953. He was taken to a hospital and died on
November 12, 1953, from hemorrhage of the brain. Medical testimony
51. Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953).
52. 268 S.W.2d 355 (Tenn. 1954).
53. 278 S.W.2d 83 (Tenn. 1955).
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at the trial included a statement that the likelihood of two hemorrhages
occurring from the initial disabled place is greater than at another
point, that a person who has had one hemorrhage is more than likely to
have another one, and that heavy lifting or exertion would bear on this
condition.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Prewitt, affirmed the
judgment for the complainant:
"In the present case the deceased was engaged in carrying heavy blocks
and while it does not appear that he had a block on his shoulder at the
time he suffered the attack, it does appear that he had been carrying
heavy blocks regularly, and we may infer that this strain of carrying4
these heavy loads was one of the contributing causes to the hemorrhage."5
The process of reasoning here is from the fatal hemorrhage to the
hemorrhage six months before and from that to the strain resulting
from heavy lifting connected with the employment in the past.
Under the Tennessee cases, an accidental injury can "arise out of"
employment where it is contributed to by the usual, or even less than
usual, exertions associated with the work.55 Unusual exertion surrounded the first heart attack involved in the case of Powers v.
Beasley.56 The employee was engaged in carrying poles weighing 250
to 300 pounds on a hot day when he had the first attack. He never
returned to work and died six months later from a second attack. The
Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for compensation to the widow in
an opinion by Justice Tomlinson. Substantial evidence in support of
the trial judge's finding that the death was substantially contributed
to by the first attack was found in the testimony of a physician to the
effect that the first attack so impaired the employee's heart as to make
57
it less capable of withstanding the second.
Lester v. Bays Mountain Construction Co. 58 is a federal court decision in which Tennessee workmen's compensation law was applied in
a diversity of citizenship case. The employee was caught between an
upright steel beam and the employer's truck, and he suffered contusions on the upper right portion of his body. First aid was administered but the injury was not considered serious, and the employee continued working. At the time the employee had high blood pressure
and heart and kidney trouble. He died of heart failure and kidney
disease nine months later. The medical evidence in the trial of the
case was to the effect that there was no connection between the accident and the death. The United States District Court in Knoxville,
54. Id. at 84.
55. Patterson Transfer Co. v. Lewis, 195 Tenn. 474, 260 S.W.2d 182 (1953);

Lay v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 196 Tenn. 63, 264 S.W.2d 223 (1953); see Sanders

and Bowman, Labor Law and Workmen's Compensation-1954 Tennessee Survey, 7 VANM. L. REv. 861, 867-70 (1954).
56. 276 S.W.2d 720 (Tenn. 1955).

57. Id. at 722.

58. 121 F. Supp. 25 (E.D. Tenn. 1954).

1050

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

Judge Taylor, dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff failed to carry the
burden of proof on the "arising out of" element. Plaintiff had to show
the accident caused or aggravated the condition causing death. The
medical evidence had to be relied on as to the best evidence available.
Here there was no evidence that the original injury was in any way
connected with the cause of death. The case highlights the vital
significance of medical testimony in questions of causation. While in
two cases during the survey year the Tennessee Supreme Court did not
feel that it was bound to follow the medical testimony with regard to
severity of injury and extent of disability, those cases are distinguishable from the instant case because of the relative competence of the
non-medical witness in the particular area in contrast with the tracing
of causation.59
In Harriman Manufacturing Co. v. Shadden,6 0 the petitioner hurt
his back while engaged in heavy lifting for the defendant company on
August 7, 1952. He was returned to work by the company physician
after about three weeks and then quit within a few days. Approximately two months later he was examined and employed by another
employer where he also engaged in heavy lifting. He remained in this
employment a little over two months. After visits to several doctors
and differences of opinion as to the nature of his ailment, the employee
was operated for a ruptured disc in May, 1953. An award for permanent partial disability was affirmed by the Supreme Court. There
was no showing of any injury subsequent to the one in question and
"the evidence gives the petitioner a good reputation for honesty."
Hence, there.was material evidence to support the trial court's finding
that the injury arose out of and in the course of the first employment,
and the Supreme Court's reviewing function was limited to ascertaining whether or not such material evidence existed.
In Lynch v. La Rue,6 1 compensation was denied because of lack of
causal connection between an accident and a cerebro-vascular disease
developing seven years later. The employee received an electric shock
from a work-connected accident in 1945 which rendered him unconscious for a time and produced headaches. He was discharged as
"completely recovered" by the company doctor six weeks later and
went to work for another employer. Except for appendix, tonsil and
hemorrhoid operations, he worked regularly until September, 1952.
Around that time he began to suffer prolonged severe headaches, blackout spells and drowsiness. His malady was diagnosed as cerebrovascular disease. He was operated on and continued under treatment
at the time he brought the action against the 1945 employer. The
59. Bush Bros. & Co. v. Williams, 273 S.W.2d 137 (Tenn. 1954); Armstrong

Constr. Co. v. Sams, 270 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1954).
60. 273 S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. 1954).
61. 278 S.W.2d 85 (Tenn. 1955).
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Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Tomlinson, affirmed the
dismissal of his petition for compensation by the circuit court. None
of the medical testimony was to the effect that the 1945 electric
shock caused the 1952 illness, although two such witnesses said that
such connection was possible.
"It is elementary that an award cannot be predicated solely upon the
testimony of medical experts who are not willing to go any further than
to say it 'is possible' or 'could be' that there is a causal connection between
the accident and the injury for which compensation is sought. However,
such testimony is not entirely without value if there be other evidence
from which the trial judge may reasonably infer that the injury did result
from the accident that the experts say 'could be' the cause of the injury."62
The opinion states that there was such other evidence in this casethe testimony of the injured employee that the shock was the only
head injury he had ever suffered in his life. However, the evidence
also permitted the reasonable inference that there was no casual connection. Under these circumstances, the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the trial judge that the claimant had failed to carry
the burden of proof that the injury arose out of and in the course of
his employment.
Bush Bros. & Co. v. Williams63 and Armstrong Construction Co. v.
Sams64 are notable for the limitations placed on the need for medical
testimony in establishing such factors as extent and permanency of
disability. In each instance the judgment of the lower court awarding
compensation for permanent total disability was affirmed. In the
Bush case the employee testified that he injured his back while lifting
a heavy piece of pipe which resulted in his continuing inability to
perform physical labor, the only work he was qualified to perform.
The testimony of company doctors who examined and treated him
indicated a lumbo sacral strain, which in all probability resulted from
a congenital weakness in the back, and the employee's ability to
perform his work by wearing a brace. The Supreme Court, in an
opinion by Justice Swepston, found substantial material evidence of
both causation and disability. The predisposition to a weak back would
not be any reason for denying compensation. The trial judge was
not bound to accept the statements of the doctors about the ability of
the claimant to go back to work by wearing a brace. "[H]e was
entitled to determine from all of the evidence in the case, both expert
and non-expert, the extent of the disability, that is whether partial
or permanent, and if partial, what amount" 65 In the Armstrong case
there were medical witnesses on each side but the only one who was
an orthopedic specialist testified for the employer that claimant had
62. Id. at 86.

63. 273 S.W.2d 137 (Tenn. 1954).
64. 270 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1954).

65. Supra note 63, at 139.
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not suffered a total and permanent injury. This factor was accorded
no significance in the opinion of the Supreme Court by Chief Justice
Neil. The testimony of lay witnesses, as well as all the medical witnesses, was looked to in finding support for the lower court's findings.
Injury by Accident in the Course of Employment: The "in course of
employment" element in workmen's compensation is concerned with
examining the employee's relationship to his employment in terms of
time, place and conduct when the accidental injury is incurred. Jones
v. Corder,66 already discussed, is of equal significance under this heading. In that case, however, a discussion of this phase would simply
parallel the causal connection aspect.
Bennett v. Vanderbilt University 7 establishes some new law in the
state on this aspect of workmen's compensation. The decision places
Tennessee with the minority of jurisdictions in holding that an injury
on a parking lot maintained by the employer is not in the course of
the employment. The employee was walking to her car in the employers' parking lot, located across the street from her place of
employment, where without cost she was permitted but not required
to park. She tripped over a timber placed in the lot to separate lines
of cars, suffering serious injury. In an opinion by Justice Swepston,
the Supreme Court affirmed the action of the trial judge in dismissing
the petition for compensation. Although the precise point had not
been decided before, the opinion treats the decision in Smith v. Camel
Mfg. Co.68 as stating the controlling principles. That case did not involve an accident on any premises or property of the employer but on
a public sidewalk. In it the Supreme Court of Tennessee had rejected
the "so close" concept as bringing a person within the course of his
employment for purposes of the statute. This rejection of the "so
close" concept in the Camel Manufacturing case was coupled with this
dictum: "unless there were some special considerations as the requirement of use of a special road or way, of if the manner of travel or the
way of travel was within the contemplation of the contract of employment. '69 The court treats this as stating a general rule on "going and
coming" from an employee's home to the place where he actually
performs the duties of his job. In its broader implications this decision
would appear to be against a rather overwhelming weight of authority
in its conception of "premises. ' 70 Specifically, as to injuries on parking
lots owned and maintained by the employer for his employees, the
usual rule would treat these as injuries on the premises of the employer.71 "If the employee works for a college, the premises is the
66. 196 Tenn. 478, 268 S.W.2d 359 (Tenn. 1954).
67. 277 S.W.2d 386 (Tenn. 1955).
68. 192 Tenn. 670, 241 S.W.2d 771 (1951).
69. Id. at 678, 241 S.W.2d at 774.
70. See 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 15.10, 15.14, 15.41
71. 1 id. § 15.14.

(1952),
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entire campus."7 2 The minority view on parking lots with which the
Tennessee court agrees is developed in a number of Michigan cases
cited in the opinion. No point is made in the opinion of the location
of the lot across a city street or the fact of its use by other than employees.
Misconduct and Refusal of Medical Examination: Hoodenpyle v.
Patterson 3 involved the application of that section of the Tennessee
Workmen's Compensation Statute which disallows compensation for
injury or death due to the employees wilful misconduct.7 4 The employee in this instance was working as a coal miner in a "room" where
it had been noted that a part of the roof was in dangerous condition.
He was killed by the fall of a large rock from the roof. The general
foreman testified that on the day before the accident he had instructed
the deceased not "to shoot any more coal" in that part of the room
or load any more coal under the loose rock without timbering it up.
The foreman in charge on the day of the accident testified that he
told the deceased at 2:30 p.m. to get his tools and go home because of
the roof condition, and that deceased said he would and brought his
tools toward the entry. At quitting time, thirty minutes later,
deceased was found dead under the rock at the back of the "room" near
a car which had been partly loaded. The trial judge found for the
widow, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Tomlinson's opinion
points out that the affirmative evidence was that the employee had
violated no instructions of his supervisor on the day prior to the
accident, and on the day of the accident the evidence as to his stated
intention and the taking of his tools toward the entry permitted the
inference that he was not loading coal at the time of the accident.
There was testimony to the effect that it was impossible to say what
deceased was doing when killed. The element of deliberateness in the
statutory requirement of "wilful" misconduct as opposed to accident,
negligence, inadvertence or mere thoughtless act, coupled with the
burden of proof on the employer invoking such a defense, results in
the court seeing no basis for disturbing the findings of the trial court.
Pee Wee Coal Co. v. Hensley,7 5 raises but does not decide whether or
not an injured employee's mental illness would excuse non-compliance
with the statutory provision, which states he "must submit" to a
physician's examination when "requested" by the employer.7 6 The
lower court had found total and permanent disability for the claimant
coal miner upon whom a very heavy slab had fallen. It had found a
refusal on part of the injured employee to submit to medical examina72. 1 id. § 15.41.
73. 277 S.W.2d 351 (Tenn. 1955).
74. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6861 (Williams 1934).
75. 268 S.W.2d 367 (Tenn. 1954).
76. TENN. CODE ANx. § 6875 (Williams 1934).
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tion after a certain date but rejected a defense on this ground since
his mental condition was such that he was incapable of making a
decision to refuse or accept. The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion
by Justice Tomlinson but did not find it necessary to decide whether
compensation payments are suspended by the refusal of a mentally ill
employee to submit to a requested medical examination:
"The declining of an offer of such further medical attention as 'the
petitioner deemed necessary or wished' is not the refusal of a request for
further medical examination. An offer is not a request. Therefore, this
defense interposed by the answer did not authorize the suspension of the
payments required by the statute if Hensley were otherwise entitled
thereto. This requirement of the statute is contrary to common law. It
'must, therefore be strictly construed, so as not to impose upon the plaintiff
any further obligation than is expressly required.' "7?

Third Parties and Subrogation: In Majors v. Moneymaker

8

the

plaintiff and defendant in a negligence action were fellow employees,

who were injured while driving in defendant's car in the course of
their employment. Each received workmen's compensation payments
on behalf of the employer for injuries suffered in the accident. Plaintiff
and her husband brought separate actions to recover damages from
the defendant for the same accident. A plea in abatement was filed in
each case in which it was averred that the plaintiff and defendant
were bound by the workmen's compensation law, that the defendant
was not "such other or third party or person" within the meaning of
the statute as would permit her to be sued for negligence at common
law, and that enforcement of the right of the plaintiff against her
employer was the exclusive remedy against either the defendant or
the employer. Plaintiff demurred to this plea alleging legal insufficiency for the reason that the defendant was not the plaintiff's employer "or such other person legally liable to pay Workmen's Compensation to her." The lower court sustained the plea in abatement and dismissed the suits. The Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Chief
Justice Neil. The decision is based on Code Section 6859, which in
general makes the rights and remedies under the statute exclusive, and
an interpretation of Code Section 6865, which retains a common-law
remedy against the negligent third party causing the death or injury
of the employee. The statute states that this last shall be true when
the injury "was caused under circumstances creating a legal liability
against some person other than the employer. . .

."

The court reasons

that the negligence of the defendant in the course of her employment
created a legal liability against her employer which renders Section
6865 inapplicable since it is limited to circumstances creating liability
against some person other than the employer. The right of subrogation
77. Supra note 75, at 370.
78. 270 S.W.2d 328 (Tenn. 1954).
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given by the section to the employer, or his insurance carrier, would,
if plaintiff's construction were allowed, the court says, result in the
anomalous situation of the employer recovering from the negligent
fellow employee (the defendant) all sums paid as compensation to the
plaintiff plus unlimited damages at common law. The opinion discusses
and rejects as inapplicable the general treatment of the problem in
Professor Larson's treatise on workmen's compensationJ 9
One aspect of the subrogation rights of the employer was dealt with
in Millican v. Home Stores, Inc.80 In this case the employee had been
killed in an automobile collision with third parties. His widow gave a
covenant not to sue and dismissed a suit with prejudice in making
settlements of her claims against these parties without the consent of
the employer for sums less than the amount available to her under
the workmen's compensation statute. A compensation award to the
widow for the statutory amount less that received from the third
parties was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an opinion by Justice
Tomlinson. The employer's claim that the widow's receipt of money
from the third parties in settlement of alleged claims against them
relieved it of liability is rejected. The old wording of Section 6865 had
been interpreted in effect as requiring the injured employee or his
dependents strictly to elect whether he would proceed against the
employer or third persons.8 1 The 1949 amendment to this section permitted the employee to receive compensation from the employer and
proceed against a third party at the same time, with the employer to
the extent of his interest having a lien on the employee's recovery or
settlement and being entitled to assignment of the claim against the
third party under described circumstances. The employer's obligation
to the widow in Millican decision is unaffected by her settlements, the
court says, because the language of Section 6865, as amended, by necessary implication authorizes the employee to settle without suit-"by
judgment, settlement or otherwise, the employer shall be subrogated."
Hence the employer remains fully liable for compensation subject to
a deduction for the amount received under the settlements. It is
observed that it is unlikely that the question will be presented
frequently since settlements with third parties for less than the amount
recoverable under the workmen's compensation statute will rarely be
made.
Statute of Limitations: Section 6884 (1) of the Tennessee Code sets a
one year statute of limitations "after the occurrence of the injury" for
proceedings to be instituted by the employee. Section 6874 bars a
claim "unless within one year after the accident resulting in injury"
79. 2 LARSON, WORKiEN'S COMAPENSATION §§ 71.00-77.30 (1952).

80. 270 S.W.2d 372 (Tenn. 1954).
81. Walters v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 166 Tenn. 383, 389, 61 S.W.2d 666, 668

(1933).

1056

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 8

notice is given the employer and a claim filed with the proper tribunal.
To harmonize the differences in the statutory wording the rule has
been propounded in Tennessee that the statute of limitations runs from
82
the date of injury rather than the date of accident.
In Johnsonv. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 83 the applica-

tion of Tennessee 'law in a federal case resulted in the suit being
barred. The accident occurred on December 8, 1952, and the employee
was treated in employer's clinic, by a specialist and hospitalized. He
was away from work for four months. The employee signed an insurance paper in which he stated that his injury was a possible ruptured
disc in his back. Suit was filed fifteen months and twenty-two days
after the accident. He had continued to work in the meantime although the injury was apparently severe. He brought suit after being
discharged. The court, in an opinion by Judge Taylor, found that he
had actual or constructive notice of his condition from the date of
signing the insurance paper and that the doctors and the employer
had not fraudulently concealed the nature of his injury from him.
Netherlandv. Mead Corp.84 was treated as controlling.
Wilson v. Van Buren County85 involved the running of the statute in
an occupational disease case. The employee, who worked in a quarry,
developed pneumoconiosis in 1949 and then became permanently disabled in September, 1952. He instituted suit within sixteen days after
receiving an X-ray report from the State Department of Public Health
stating that his condition had been diagnosed as silicosis. The latter
disease is compensable under the Tennessee statute while pneumoconiosis is not. Section 6852 of the Tennessee Code provides that an
employee has an occupational disease when the disease or condition
has developed to such extent that it can be diagnosed as an occupational disease. The one year statute begins to run "after the beginning
of incapacity for work" resulting from the disease. The lower court's
denial of compensation on the ground that the notice and suit had not
been timely was reversed by the Supreme Court in an opinion by
Special Justice White. Plaintiff had no cause of action prior to his
discovery in September, 1952, that he had an occupational disease
listed in the statute, namely silicosis. The employee was not required
to commence suit prior to actual or constructive knowledge on his part
that he had a compensable disease. He brought suit sixteen days after
such knowledge in this case. His knowledge of or concerning the
results of a non-compensable occupational disease are not regarded
as having any bearing on the question.
Hutto v. Benson 8 was discussed in the 1954 Survey. It held that the
82. Ogle v. Tennessee Eastman Corp., 185 Tenn. 527, 206 S.W.2d 909 (1947).
83. 126 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Tenn. 1954).

84. 170 Tenn. 520, 98 S.W.2d 76 (1936).
85. 268 S.W.2d 363 (Tenn. 1954), 8 VAND. L. REV. 161.
86. 212 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1954); see Wade, Conflict of Laws-1954 Tennessee
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Tennessee statute of limitations applied to the injury of an employee
in a foreign jurisdiction (Texas), but that Tennessee would look to the
law of the place of injury in order to determine when a cause of action
would accrue.
Occupational Disease: In addition to Wilson v. Van Buren County,
discussed above in the Statute of Limitations section, the occupational
disease aspects of the Tennessee statute were involved in Housley v.
American Mutual Liability Co. 87 This case raised a question as to when
an employee could be said to have an occupational disease for purposes
of the statutory barring of coverage of such diseases which an employee has on the effective date of this amendatory act.88 The employee
in question was working for the employer on March 12, 1947, the
effective date of the amendatory act. He died in 1951 of silicosis, a
listed disease, which was not suspected until a month before his death.
The statute says that the employee has the occupational disease when
the condition has developed to the extent that it can be diagnosed as
such and that the burden is on the employee as to the coverage after
the 1947 amendment. In the Housley case the Supreme Court affirmed
a judgment of the trial court awarding compensation to the widow
with an opinion by Chief Justice Neil. The evidence is taken to support
a finding that the presence of the occupational disease could not have
been diagnosed prior to the effective date of the amended act and that
deceased was exposed at his employment to conditions conducive to
the contraction of silicosis. He was exposed to such conditions for
years before 1947 but exposure to silicia does not necessarily result in
silicosis. There was no evidence that he had actually contracted the
disease prior to that time, or that he was aware of silicosis or that it
could have been diagnosed as such during that period. In fact, the
employee's condition was not such as to suggest any serious disability
until 1950 and then he was diagnosed and treated for tuberculosis by
eminent medical authorities up until thirty days before his death.
Degree of Disability and Computation of Benefits: Tibbals Flooring
Co. v. Brewster 9 raises once more the question of the degree of disability when injury is limited to a specific member covered in the
schedule set forth in Code Section 6878.9 In this case the employee's
arm was severely cut while operating a power saw and because of pain
he lost the use of it. He was qualified to perform manual labor only.
The lower court awarded compensation for total and permanent
disability and the Supreme Court affirmed in an opinion by Chief
Justice Neil. "It cannot be doubted but that where there is an injury
to a specific member there can be no award for total and permanent

Survey, 7 VAND. L. REV.

755,

758-61 (1954).

87. 270 S.W.2d 349 (Tenn. 1954).
88. TENN. CODE ANN. § 6852 (d) (Williams Supp. 1952).
89. 270 S.W.2d 323 (Tenn. 1954).
90. See particularly TENN. CODE ANw. § 6878(c) (Williams 1934).
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disability unless the injury affects the body to such an extent that he
is not able to earn a living." 91 There was medical testimony to the
effect that the employee was suffering a 100 per cent disability and, for
the defendant, to the effect that he was not a one-armed man and that
the injured arm was better than if he had no arm at all. The court's
opinion states that the issue is one of fact and that there is material
evidence to support the findings of the trial judge. In this case the
court is applying what has been termed the Plumlee doctrine.92 The
crucial point in such a case apparently is the factual determination
as to the effect of the injury being limited to the particular member.
In Hartley v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co.,93 the only question related to
the method of computing the injured employee's average weekly wage
for purposes of the compensation statute. Code Section 6852 (c) carries
a definition of "average weekly wages" which in general provides for
dividing earnings by weeks worked making allowance for days "lost"
by the employee in excess of seven. In the Hartley case the employee
had been laid off eight weeks due to the making of repairs to the work
premises, and he had been out on strike for sixteen weeks. The lower
court deducted the eight weeks but refused to deduct the sixteen weeks
before dividing the earnings of the year to arrive at an average weekly
figure. This method is affirmed by the Supreme Court in an opinion
by Chief Justice Neil. "The average weekly wage of an employee
should not, and is not, decreased for reasons over which he has no
control, such as closing a plant for repairs, ... occasional 'suspension
of operations due to bad weather, unforeseen shortage of material, lack
of orders, lack of cars, slack season' . . . . It is observed that all of the
foregoing are occasions and conditions resulting in the cessation of
operations by the employer .... But a strike, in which the injured
employee voluntarily participates, does not fall within the same category. '94 New Jellico Coal Co. v. Kenner, 95 is cited as the leading case
for this position. Its principle has not been overruled and it is not
violative of Article 1, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution or the Due
Process and Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Constitution of the United States. This holding seems to penalize
an employee for engaging in an activity which, so far as the case
indicates, was perfectly lawful and in accordance with a basic right of
employees. 96 Further it would seem to be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the section, which, apparently, is not to punish or
reward the employee for his past conduct but to arrive at a fair
91. Supra note 89, at 324.

92. Plumlee v. Maryland Cas. Co., 184 Tenn. 497, 201 S.W.2d 664 (1947); cf.
Adams Constr. Co. v. Cantrell, 195 Tenn. 675, 263 S.W.2d 516 (1953).
93. 276 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn. 1955).

94. Id. at 3.

95. 172 Tenn. 185, 110 S.W.2d 476 (1937).
96. See Sections 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT. 452,

457 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 163 (Supp. 1954).
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approximation of his probable future earning capacity within the
97
period covered by the award.
Other cases during the survey period involving calculation of benefits are Allen v. Atlas Boot Co.98 and Oakley v. Nashville, C. & St.
L. R.R.9 9 The latter case was filed under the Federal Employers Liability Act by the widow and guardian of two minor children of a
deceased employee of the railroad. A proposed settlement was made
subject to the approval of the trial court in which the case was pending. The court did approve the settlement and the funds were paid
into court by the railroad, the question of distribution of the net funds
between the widow and the children being reserved. The court later
ordered distribution "in accordance with the Tennessee Statutes of
Descent and Distribution." This was found in error by the Supreme
Court in an opinion by Justice Tomlinson. Under the federal statute,
the widow and children are entitled to such sums as they might
reasonably have expected to receive for support from respectively the
husband and the father during minority. The widow insisted here
on a proportion based on her life expectancy and children's proportions in terms of remaining years of minority; the Supreme Court
found that the fact stipulation filed showed an intent of the parties to
distribute in proportion to losses sustained under the federal statute.
Hence the lower court erred in using the Tennessee Statute of Descent
and Distribution. Since the claim in question is one lodged in the
widow and children by the statute and is not an asset of the deceased
employee's estate, the decision would seem to be eminently sound.
Scope of Review: In Atlas Powder Co. v. Leister,10 o the employer
appealed from an award of compensation to an injured employee by
the circuit court. It was argued that there was no material evidence
to support the finding below and that the evidence preponderated
against the finding. In this last connection the employer urged that,
by the general provision in Section 10639.1 of the 1950 Code Supplement, the reviewing court must determine whether the evidence preponderates against the lower court judgment since no jury was had.
The Supreme Court rejected this argument in an opinion by Justice
Burnett. Code Section 6885, a part of the Workmen's Compensation
Statute since 1919, permits the Supreme Court to review the evidence
only to the extent of determining whether the fact findings of the
trial court are supported by any material evidence. Section 27.1 of the
1950 Code Supplement makes Section 13 of the 1932 Code applicable
to the supplement and that section states that if provisions of different
chapters of the code appear to contravene each other, the provisions
97. See 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 60.12 (1952).

98. 268 S.W.2d 108 (Tenn. 1954).
99. 268 S.W.2d 110 (Tenn. 1954).
100. 274 S.W.2d 364 (Tenn. 1954).
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of each chapter shall prevail on questions growing out of the subject
matter of that chapter. Code Section 10639.1 is in a chapter entitled
"Practice of the Supreme Court" and Section 6885 is in a chapter
entitled "Workmen's Compensation Law." The question here being
that of practice in the Supreme Court not generally but that of a workmen's compensation case, Section 6885 would necessarily prevail over
any conflicting provision in Section 10639.1. Special provisions prevail
over general ones. The trial court's findings were found to be supported by material evidence. The credibility of the witnesses is for the
trial judge's determination.

